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Abstract Values such as respect for autonomy, safety,
enablement, independence, privacy and social connected-
ness should be reflected in the design of social robots. The
same values should affect the process by which robots are
introduced into the homes of older people to support
independent living. These values may, however, be in
tension. We explored what potential users thought about
these values, and how the tensions between them could be
resolved. With the help of partners in the ACCOMPANY
project, 21 focus groups (123 participants) were convened
in France, the Netherlands and the UK. These groups
consisted of: (i) older people, (ii) informal carers and (iii)
formal carers of older people. The participants were asked
to discuss scenarios in which there is a conflict between
older people and others over how a robot should be used,
these conflicts reflecting tensions between values. Partici-
pants favoured compromise, persuasion and negotiation as
a means of reaching agreement. Roles and related role-
norms for the robot were thought relevant to resolving
tensions, as were hypothetical agreements between users
and robot-providers before the robot is introduced into the
home. Participants’ understanding of each of the values—
autonomy, safety, enablement, independence, privacy and
social connectedness—is reported. Participants tended to
agree that autonomy often has priority over the other
values, with the exception in certain cases of safety. The
second part of the paper discusses how the values could be
incorporated into the design of social robots and opera-
tionalised in line with the views expressed by the
participants.
Keywords Social robots  Ethics  Values  Qualitative
research
Introduction
General background
Welfare states aim to ensure that vulnerable citizens have a
reasonable quality of life by providing care and support.
This includes those who are elderly and frail. The popu-
lation of older people is increasing. Between 2015 and
2020, the number of people in the UK general population
aged over 65 is expected to increase by 12% (1.1 million);
those over 85 by 18% (300,000); and the number of cen-
tenarians by 40% (7000). The general population is
expected to rise by 3%. (House of Commons Library 2015)
Across the world those aged 65 and over are predicted to
outnumber children under 5 years old by 2020. (Suzman
et al. 2015) Population ageing is a long-term trend that
began several decades ago in Europe. The proportion of the
population aged 65 years and over is increasing in every
EU Member State, European Free Trade Area country and
candidate country. The increase within the last decade
ranges from 5.2 percentage points in Malta and 4.0 per-
centage points in Finland, to less than 1.0 percentage points
in Luxembourg and Belgium. Eurostat explains the trend
by reference to increased longevity and consistently low
levels of fertility. (Eurostat 2015) At the time of the 2011
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UK census 9.2 million residents were aged 65 and over, an
increase of almost 1 million from 2001. Results show that
just 50% of those aged over 65 reported their health to be
‘‘very good’’ or ‘‘good’’, compared with 88% of the rest of
the population. In 2011, 56% (5.2 million) of those aged 65
and over were living as a couple, an increase from 52%
(4.3 million) in 2001. Those living as married couples
increased from 51 to 54% and the proportion living as
cohabiting couples almost doubled from 1.6 to 2.8%.
Around a third (31%) of those aged 65 and over were living
alone in 2011; this was a decrease from 34% in 2001.
Accordingly, welfare states face increasing costs for the
care and social support for older people who are unable to
live independently.
Older people are remaining in their own homes for
longer. The proportion of the UK population aged 65 and over
who were living in communal establishments declined from
4.5% (374,000) in 2001 to 3.7% (337,000) in 2011. (ONS
2013) The number of older people receiving support organ-
ised and/or funded by local authority social care services in
the UK is declining, severely affected by budget cuts to care
services. Spending on home care services fell by 19.4%
between 2010/11 and 2013/14. This has resulted in a 15%
decline in the number of older people receiving local authority
support with home care from 437,150 in 2010/11 to 371,770
in 2013/14. (Mortimer and Green 2015; Health and Social
Care Information Centre 2014) Older people are themselves
unpaid care providers: 14% living in households in England
andWales supplied unpaid care in 2011, compared to 12% in
2001. Those aged 65 and over may be providing 50 hours or
more unpaid care a week: up from 4.3% (341,000) in 2001 to
5.6% (497,000) in 2011. (ONS 2013) Spending on aids and
adaptations has increased by 7.3% since 2010/11 but the
number of older people benefiting from these services has
fallen by 83,945 (Mortimer and Green 2015; Health and
Social Care Information Centre 2014).
Social robots are being developed to meet the shortfall
in care, and also to assist those providing unpaid care. They
are potentially important not only in relieving loneliness
but in helping their users maintain a normal routine in the
face of frailty or in supporting them through the process of
rehabilitation.
Overarching aim
The overarching aim of this paper is to add to the debate
about the values that should underlie the development and
integration of social robots into the homes of older people,
given the trends reported in the previous section. Social
robots can provide a ‘presence’ in the home of an older
person that other technology cannot. But in order to assist
the user by fetching and carrying, by keeping track of his or
her preferred routine and acting as an early warning system
for a health emergency, the robot can sometimes be
intrusive, collect and communicate data potentially at
variance with the user’s wishes, and help to connect the
user to an outside world that can present dangers. This
paper attempts to determine the relative weight of values
like privacy, autonomy, and safety when the overall aim of
assistive technology is to help older people retain as much
of their autonomy as younger people do. These reflections
are made in the light of qualitative data about these values
collected from older people and their formal and informal
care providers. The values were drawn from an indepen-
dently devised philosophical framework that suggested an
order of priority among values like autonomy, indepen-
dence safety, and social connectedness (Sorell and Draper
2014). The research looked for the order of priority implicit
in users’ and carers’ responses. These responses were eli-
cited independently of any exposure to our framework as
we wanted to see whether these spontaneous responses
would agree with or call into question the philosophical
framework. The research was embedded in a wider pro-
gramme of robotics research called Acceptable robotiCs
COMPanions for AgiNg Years (ACCOMPANY).
ACCOMPANY and the embedded ethics research
The aim of ACCOMPANY was to develop:
a robotic companion as part of an intelligent envi-
ronment, providing services to elderly users in a
motivating and socially acceptable manner to facili-
tate independent living at home… provid[ing] phys-
ical, cognitive and social assistance in everyday home
tasks, and … contribut[ing] to the re-ablement of the
user, i.e. assist the user in being able to carry out
certain tasks on his/her own. (accompanyproject.eu)
The ACCOMPANY system used the Careobot3 platform,
which is mobile and has a manipulating arm, is capable of
working autonomously in a smart home environment and
‘‘co-learns’’ with its user (Amirabdollahian et al. 2013).
The target user was a cognitively able older person, living
alone, whose physical health and memory were starting to
decline, and whose ability to live independently in his or
her own home was threatened. Investment in systems such
as those developed by ACCOMPANY are one response to
increases in the population of older people who are unable
to care for themselves. They also address the need to offer
and provide acceptable care as economically as possible.
The findings reported in this paper represent the second
and third phases of three phases of ethics research that was
undertaken as part of the ACCOMPANY project.
The three phases of our ethics research can be seen in
Fig. 1. In Phase One we proposed an initial ethical
framework for the development of social robots on the
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basis of: (i) a review of the philosophical literature on the
ethics of designing and using social robots; and (ii) the
purposes of the robot being designed in ACCOMPANY. In
the resulting paper (Sorell and Draper 2014), we suggested
six values (respect for autonomy, safety, enablement,
independence, privacy and social connectedness) that
should inform the design of social robots for older people
keen to continue to live independently despite growing
frailty. We aimed to explore whether the six values we had
proposed at the conclusion of Phase One (Sorell and Dra-
per 2014) would be reflected in the responses of potential
stakeholders to situations that might arise when social
robots are integrated into the homes of older people. We
also wanted to know whether our view that autonomy was
the overriding value would be reflected in their intuitions
and whether other values might emerge that we had not
considered.
We also suggested an order of priority among these
values, where they conflict. We argued that tensions
between these values (especially between safety and
autonomy, autonomy and independence, safety and privacy
and sometimes between autonomy and social connected-
ness) were inevitable, and that where such tensions arose,
autonomy should be regarded as the overriding value.
In the study reported here, we aimed to explore whether
the six values we had proposed at the conclusion of Phase
One (Sorell and Draper 2014) would be reflected in the
responses of potential stakeholders to situations that might
arise when social robots are integrated into the homes of
older people. We also wanted to know whether our view
that autonomy should be the overriding value would be
reflected in their intuitions and whether other values might
emerge that we had not considered. In this paper we report
and discuss the reactions of older people and informal and
formal carers of older people to scenarios making explicit
possible tensions between these values. The data were
collected and analysed during Phase Two of our research
for ACCOMPANY. In Phase Three, the findings were
integrated into the initial framework developed in Phase
One, and we considered how our overall findings should
influence design, policy and practice concerning social
robots for older users.
Other authors have explored from a purely conceptual
point of view the potential ethical difficulties that arise
when social robots are designed to assist with care provi-
sion. For instance, Sharkey and Sharkey (2012) and Kort-
ner (2016) highlight a range of issues related specifically to
the care of older people; Coeckelbergh (2015) relates
intuitions about care, autonomy and related notions to
general considerations about modernity; and, van Wyns-
berghe (2013) applies the theoretical perspective of care
ethics to produce her value-sensitive design approach.
Similarly, Vallor (2011) provides a comprehensive review
of relevant ethics literature up to 2010 in her analysis of the
ideal of care in relation to the use care-providing tech-
nology; Sparrow (2015) argues that robotic design for older
users should be geared to promoting happiness rather than
to achieving seemingly objective measures of welfare; and,
Matthias (2015) addresses the issue of deception that may
arise when the mental image older users have of social
robots diverges from the current technological capacities.
Our research contributes to this growing literature. This
Phase One: Inial
ethical framework
informed by work
in ACCOMPANY
Phase Two:
Potenal
stakeholders’
views on guiding
principles
Phase Three: Final
framework taking
into account
stakeholders’ view
Autonomy, independence,
enablement, safety, privacy &
social connectedness
Qualitave study : data collected
and analyzed from older people,
informal & formal carers
Combining the results of
phases one and two to
produce an empirically
informed ethical framework
Fig. 1 Three phases of ethics
research on ACCOMPANY
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paper is distinctive because it reports and takes into
account the views of potential user groups in reaching
conclusions about ethical design of social robots and their
integration into the homes of older people. In this respect it
moves beyond the literature that depends on purely con-
ceptual analysis, reflecting the empirical ethics approach
that is increasingly being used to enhance bioethics anal-
ysis (e.g. see Frith 2012).
After outlining the method used in Phase Two (data
collection and analysis) and reporting and discussing our
findings (including their limitations), we suggest how ten-
sions between the six values mentioned in (ii) above can be
managed in practice. We also comment on design, policy
and practice issues.
Method
We devised four realistic scenarios (see Table 1) based on
the projected capabilities of the ACCOMPANY system and
the target user group. The scenarios reflected situations in
which the some of the values distinguished in the philo-
sophical framework could be in tension. Focus groups of
older people and formal and informal carers of older people
were asked to comment on the scenarios.
In the first scenario, the robot is programmed to encourage
Maria to move around at home and take her medication in
line with medical advice. Visiting healthcare professionals
can access information stored by the robot about Maria’s
adherence to this healthcare regime. Here there is potential
for more than one kind of tension between different pairs of
autonomy, independence, privacy and safety. In the second
scenario, Frank is autonomously resisting attempts to help
him widen his social network (social connectedness) by
programming the robot to encourage him to access an online
forum about fishing, which used to be his main leisure
activity. The third scenario was devised to draw out issues
raised by the empathic ‘mask’ being developed in
ACCOMPANY. This mask was intended to simulate a
companion’s responses to events in the user’s environment
(e.g. alarm at a plant being knocked over) or annoyance or
sadness if the user over-used a squeeze-sensitive interface
for summoning the robot urgently (Marti et al. 2014). In the
scenario, the robot is programmed to respond negatively to
rudeness on the part of its user, Nina. Nina’s rudeness is
disrupting her care-relationships and causing distress to her
daughter (autonomy, independence, social connectedness).
In the final scenario, privacy, independence, autonomy and
safety are in tension as Louis resists attempts by his family to
programme his robot to alert them when he falls, and his
family wish to place controls on his using his robot as an
interface for online gambling activities.
The method for data collection and analysis used in this
project has already been peer-reviewed and published in
detail elsewhere (Draper et al 2014b; Bedaf et al. 2016).
Accordingly, it is only reported in brief here. Working with
the ACCOMPANY user panels established by consortium
members Centre Expert in Technologies and Services
Maintien en Autonomie a` Domicile des Personnes Aˆge´es
(MoDPA), Hogeschool ZUYD (ZUYD) and University of
Hertfordshire (UH), along with the Birmingham One
Thousand Elders, University of Birmingham (UoB), 21
focus groups (FGs) were convened at the four different
sites in France, the Netherlands and the UK (respectively).
These included 123 participants who were older people, or
informal (family members, friends etc.) or formal (paid,
trained) carers of older people (see Table 2).
Written consent was obtained from all participants prior
to participation. FGs were conducted in local languages by
local facilitators, with each site using the same facilitators
for all groups. To ensure consistency across the sites, a
topic guide with a series of prompts was designed, and the
FG facilitators discussed in advance how this should be
used to ensure common understanding.
The FGs were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.
One representative transcript from each kind of group
(older people, informal carers, formal carers) was trans-
lated into English from French and Dutch. All of the
English transcriptions were then coded independently by
Draper and Sorell using a combination of directed analysis
(seeking to identify text that corresponded to the six values
identified in Phase One) and Richie and Spencer’s frame-
work analysis (Ritchie and Spencer 2002). This resulted in
a high degree of inter-coder agreement. The resulting
coding and the emerging themes were discussed with the
other facilitators, who coded the outstanding non-English
transcriptions, noting any disconfirming data and new
themes, and identifying and translating illustrative quota-
tions. Draper discussed the resulting coding one to one with
each of the two other coders. A draft report was then cir-
culated to all facilitators for comment and agreement.
Figure 2 summarizes how data was collected, analysed and
combined to reduce inconsistency between the four sites
and different countries. The data were analysed by group—
older people (OP), informal carers (IC) and formal carers
(FC). Codes and themes were identified within these
groups of data, and a data set was produced for each group
of quotations from different participants within each focus
group for each of the codes. The main themes were
organised into group mind-maps to highlight inter-con-
nections. These mind maps can be seen in Figs. 3, 4 and 5.
Favourable local ethical review was obtained by each
participating centre, and EU ethical standards were always
observed.
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Findings
This was a large study by the standards of qualitative
research. Here we report the main results, namely whether
and how participants invoked the six values from Phase
One in their discussion of the scenarios. We report how
tensions between the six values were addressed and whe-
ther autonomy was given more weight than other values
when it conflicted with other values.1
Table 1 The scenarios discussed in the focus groups
Scenario 1—MARIA
Marie, who is 78 years old, has lived alone since her husband died ten years ago. She has ulcers on her leg, the dressings for which are changed
by a nurse once a week. It is important for the healing of these ulcers that she moves around as much as possible to encourage circulation to her
legs and avoid further swelling. Her Care-O-bot knows that she should be encouraged to move about, and suggests several times a day that she
walks with it to look out of the window at either the garden or the street below. Marie is reluctant to get up from her chair because she is afraid
of falling and walking is uncomfortable. She also uses the Care-O-bot to get drinks for her from the kitchen, even though the nurse has
suggested that she should go to the kitchen with the Care-O-bot but let it carry the drinks back to her chair for her. Also the Care-O-bot can
only bring bottles of water to her and the nurse suggests that she would feel warmer if she made herself hot drinks. The Care-O-bot reminds
her to take her antibiotics and to keep her leg up on a stool when she returns to her chair after, for example, going to the toilet. She is grateful
for the reminders about the antibiotics but feels irritated about the reminders to elevate her leg as she hardly ever forgets to do this but she likes
to get comfortable first. She sometimes put her leg down so that her cat can sit on her lap more comfortably. Her ulcers are slow to heal but
when the nurse asks if Marie is moving around more she always says that she is, even though she ignores the prompts to come to the window
and doesn’t go to the kitchen with the robot.
Scenario 2—FRANK
Frank is 89 years old and generally frail. He lives alone and needs assistance from a Care-O-bot to live independently. He prefers the Care-O-
bot to having the neighbours or carers helping him because he thinks they are inclined to be intrusive and interfering. He uses his Care-O-bot
interface to talk about fishing with a friend he has known since childhood. Neither of them can go fishing anymore, but they enjoy talking about
when they did and discussing items in a fishing magazine that they both subscribe to. They talk about once a month. Frank really looks forward
to these conversations and they put him in a good mood for days afterwards. He becomes quite miserable if his friend is in hospital and unable
to talk to him. Frank’s daughter has suggested that the Care-O-bot should be used to encourage Frank join a virtual fishing forum on the
internet. She is worried that he only has one friend who is older and poorly and may die leaving Frank with no one else to talk to about fishing.
Frank says that he is too old to be making new friends.
Scenario 3—NINA
Nina who is 70 years old had a stroke two years ago but has now recovered the use of her arm though one side of her face droops slightly. She is
self-conscious about this, but it does not affect her physical functioning. She is supported at home by a Care-O-bot. Since having the stroke
she has become quite irritable and impatient. She often shouts at her daughter when she visits and complains angrily about her condition. Her
daughter finds this very upsetting and has come to dread her visits. Nina has been so rude and demanding that two cleaners have already refused
to work for her anymore. She is usually polite with her friends. Her Care-O-bot has been programmed so that it will not do things for her if she
asks sharply or in a demanding tone. It encourages her to say please and thank you and will withdraw help until she does so. Nina finds this
infuriating and insists that the Care-O-bot is reprogrammed to do what she asks no matter how she asks for help.
Scenario 4—LOUIS
Louis, who is 75 years old, is determined to continue to live in his own home, which is in a small town in which two of his sons live. He is
regularly visited by his daughters-in-law, who bring him food, help with his cleaning and do his laundry. Louis was left with some weakness in
one of his legs as a result of an accident in his 40’s. He is becoming frail and is finding it increasingly difficult to get up from his chair and walk
with his sticks. Louis is supported at home by a Care-O-bot. The Care-O-bot is programmed to help support him when he gets up from his
chair and can be summoned to help if he falls. Louis has discovered that he can use the interface on the Care-O-bot to visit online gambling
sites and enjoys playing poker in the evening. He also uses the interface to give his doctor his blood pressure measurements, and sometimes his
medication is adjusted as a result of the measurements he gives. Louis falls over about once a week on average. On the whole he is able to get
up again with the help of the Care-O-bot, but he recently was on the floor for several hours unable to get up and developed a bladder infection
from lying in the cold unable to reach the toilet. He was in bed for several days as a result. This placed an additional burden on his daughters-in-
law, who took turns to stay with him during the day until he was well enough to live alone. It was during this time that his daughters-in-law
realised that he used the Care-O-bot to play poker on line. They are very unhappy about this as he often loses money. They want access to the
poker site to be blocked. They have taken away his sticks so that he has to use his walking frame, which means that he is less likely to fall. They
want the Care-O-bot to be programmed so that it alerts them as soon as he falls. Louis insists that it is up to him what he does with his own
money and says that he doesn’t want them to come rushing around every time he falls because he can usually get himself up.
Table 2 Focus groups and participants
1 Elsewhere, we have reported initial findings for groups comprising
older people (Draper et al. 2014a), and incidental findings: (1) the
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We will follow qualitative reporting norms, providing
illustrative quotations from our data set. Qualitative anal-
ysis is a process of interpretation that takes into account the
strength of the views expressed as well as how often they
were similarly expressed within the different participant
groupings. The purpose is to explore the views of the
participants. Accordingly, no attempt will be made here to
quantify the views or to generalise from them.
We will start with general responses to the scenarios.
Responses to the tensions
The participants tended to regard the scenarios as practical
problems of reconciling user and carer interests where
there was disagreement over how the robot was to be used.
D a t a c o l l e c o n 
( 2 1 f o c u s g r o u p s ) 
T r a n s c r i p o n 
( 2 1 f o c u s g r o u p s ) 
T r a n s l a o n 
( 6 f o c u s g r o u p s , 3 e a c h 
M A D o P A a n d Z U Y D ) 
I n i a l m e e n g t o 
a g r e e c o d e s . 
G e n e r a o n o f 
t h e m e s 
P r e s e n t a o n o f 
t h e m e s a n d c o d e s 
t o o t h e r 
f a c i l i t a t o r s 
C o d i n g o f 
r e m a i n i n g 9 f o c u s 
g r o u p s ( M A D o P A 
& Z U Y D ) 
R e p o r t 
M A D o P A 
( 6 F G s ) 
R e p o r t 
Z U Y D 
( 3 F G s ) 
R e p o r t
 




 
c o m b i n i n g a l l 2 1 
F G s r e s u l t s 
C i r c u l a t e d t o a l l 
I n i  a l d i r e c t e d a n a l y s i s 
( 2 x i n d e p e n d e n t 
c o d e r s ; 1 2 x 
t r a n s c r i p t s ) 
F i n a l R e p o r t 
6 f o c u s g r o u p s 
c o n d u c t e d i n 
E n g l i s h 
Fig. 2 Method of data
collection and analysis
Fig. 3 Mind map of analysis of
older people groups. In this
figure the black boxes represent
themes that pervaded all of the
other main themes, which are
represented by the grey boxes.
The lines between the boxes
show more specific inter-
relations. For instance, views
about social connectedness,
behaviour modification, safety
and privacy were all
conditioned by views about
autonomy, whereas the views
about the role of the robot arose
mostly in relation to privacy and
safety
Footnote 1 continued
acceptability of using robots to modify behaviour (Draper and Sorell
2014) including impoliteness; (2) the impact of the robot on care
relationships between older people and their formal and informal
carers (Jenkins and Draper 2015); and (3) the possible extent to which
the use of care robots may increase the ‘care gap’ for older people,
eventually reducing rather than increasing independence (Bedaf et al.
2016).
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We noted three broad problem-solving strategies used by
participants: (a) finding a process through which the parties
in the scenario could reach agreement after compromising
or trying out one another’s suggested uses of the robot;
(b) reading different roles for the robot into the scenarios
and then applying relevant role-norms to the tension raised
Fig. 4 Mind map of the
analysis of the informal carer
groups. In this figure, grey
boxes represent the main themes
and white boxes the sub-themes.
The lines between the boxes
show the inter-relationships
between the themes and sub-
themes. For example,
persuasion was a theme in its
own right but views about
persuasion influenced views
about resistance, autonomy, the
need for a human element and
family/caring issues (which
were also themes in their own
right) and it led to, or
influenced, discussions about
how the robot was introduced
into the home of an older person
and relationships with
professional carers
Fig. 5 Mind map of the analysis of the formal carers groups. In this
figure, grey boxes represent the main themes and white boxes the sub-
themes. The lines between the boxes show the inter-relationships
between the themes and sub-themes. For example, respect for
autonomy was a theme in its own right but views about respect for
autonomy influenced views about the role of negotiation, safety,
privacy and how the robot was perceived (which were also themes in
their own right) but it was less influential in the sub-themes than
perceptions of the robot, which led to, or influenced, discussions
about the need for a human element, adherence and relationships
within care teams. Protecting or promoting the best interests of older
people, on the other hand, was a sub-theme in considerations of
respect for autonomy, safety and negotiation
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by the scenario; (c) hypothesising an agreement between
users and providers of the robot prior to its introduction and
then referring back to the hypothesised details of this prior
agreement to resolve conflicts.
Compromise, persuasion and negotiation
All three groups sought to accommodate the interests of the
disagreeing parties, giving some weight to all of the values
in play. Participants often referred to examples from their
own experience of using compromise, persuasion or
negotiation when providing2 or receiving care. OP partic-
ipants talked in terms of compromises between parties to
the tension in which everyone conceded something or
sought common ground. The IC participants relied heavily
on persuasion as the means of bring the older person
around to a view that would resolve the tension. FC par-
ticipants tended to speak about the need to negotiate with
older people. For example, in the second scenario, Frank
resists his daughter’s idea of using the robot to connect him
with an online group of fishermen. One OP participant
suggested Frank try out—get a ‘‘taste’’ of—the online
group before definitively rejecting it. This is a typical
example of compromise. An IF participant suggested that
the experience of the online forum could be contrived ‘by
accident’ for Frank by his daughter in the hope that he
might thereby be persuaded to try using it. A FC participant
responding to the Maria scenario thought that compliance
should be negotiated so that Maria could decide when to
schedule movement: in this way adherence to her medical
regime would not conflict with other things she wanted to
do, such as watching a favourite television programme:
1. Well if would she could just show him a taste of…
just a taste. If he doesn’t like it well she backs off,
she’s tried just to show him (UoB OP1 P23 FRANK)
2. You could pretend you pressed the wrong button on
the robot or something and saw it by chance. By the
time he’s tried to find out what’s happened or you tell
him the truth, he’ll have seen the channel and may
well be interested. Sometimes you have to use fair
means and foul to change people’s minds…
(MADoPA OP1 P4 FRANK)
3. Actually it should be such that persons are able to
modify the time schedule a little bit, it should not be a
black and white option like six o’ clock is six o’ clock,
or 8 is 8, with no room for adaptation (ZUYD FC1
P4 MARIA)
UoB OP1 P2’s comment (quotation 2) above is typical of
the way in which the autonomy of the older person was used
to define the limits of these processes. In broad terms, the
OP participants—whilst sympathetic to the problems that
this could create—tended to feel that the wishes of the older
person should prevail if a mutually satisfactory compromise
could not be reached. IC participants tended to accept that
persuasion would only take them so far towards a resolu-
tion, and that they might ultimately have to capitulate to the
older person. FC participants were also inclined to accept
that they were not able to force a settlement but seemed
generally less willing to make concessions to their clients
than the IC participants. In quotation 4, for instance, FCs are
discussing how to manage complaining about unavoidable
lateness by firmly explaining the constraints under which
they re operating. In quotation 5 FCs are discussing Louis’
unwillingness to let the robot to monitor and report his falls.
Here accepting the alert is presented as a concession Louis
needs to make to enable his continued care at home.
4. They’ll understand, but they’ll still make some kind
of comment like, ‘‘Ah, did you sleep through your
alarm clock?’’, and I’ll say, ‘‘No, but sometimes the
unexpected happens’’, and they’ll say ‘‘True enough’’.
And if it goes too far, as it has done sometimes
already, I’ll say things like, ‘‘What if something hap-
pened to you? Would you like it if after half an hour I
said to you, listen I have to go now because someone
else is waiting for me? What would you say? I’m sure
you’d rather I stayed with you.’’ After that, they tend to
calm down, but you always have to talk to them and
explain things! (MADoPA FC1 P5 LOUIS)
5. the bottom line is ‘Louis you wanna stay in your
own home, but you’re not the only person involved in
this, we don’t have any peace of mind unless you
agree to, this is the bare minimum, you gonna let us
be alerted when you fall on the floor, else we can’t
support you staying at home any more’ (UH FC P5
LOUIS)
2 It should be noted the several of the participants in the older people
group had at some point themselves provided care for an older person,
some of those in the informal care giver group had at one time been
formal carers and some of those in the formal carer groups had
experience of being an informal carer.
3 The quotations are labelled so as to protect the participants’
identity. The first group of letter denote the site (e.g. UoB = Univer-
sity of Birmingham, UK; MADoPA = Centre Expert in Technologies
and Services Maintien en Autonomie a` Domicile des Personnes
Aˆge´es, Fr; UH = University of Hertfordshire, UK; ZUYD = Ho-
geschool ZUYD, NL). This is followed by the group type as outlined
in ‘‘Method’’ section (OP = older persons; IF = informal carer;
FC = formal carer. The final letters/numbers refer to number
allocated to the participant in their group. So, for example MADoPA
FC1 P5 means that the site was MADoPA, the group was their first
group of formal carers and participant number 5 is being quoted. The
case being referred to by the participant is in capitals MARIA
(scenario 1), FRANK (scenario 2), NINA (scenario 3), LOUIS
(scenario 4).
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What participants doubted, however, was whether a robot
would be capable of the persuasion or negotiation in which
human carers regularly engaged. For this reason they
believed that robots could not replace humans (many also
believed that robots should not replace humans). In their
responses to the scenarios, many assumed or asserted the
need for a human intermediary between the older person
and the robot, who would persuade or conduct the
negotiation.
6. it still requires a person to explain this to her and
model it to her and to see if she can actually do it
because she might not be able to do it (UH IC P1
NINA)
7. That’s the thing that’s going to make the difference
between a carer and a machine. A professional care
worker is going to be able to stimulate, encourage
and repeat all these requests, and so on, and also
explain again and again why we’re there, why that
person has to get up and go for a walk, etc. I think
that’s what’s likely to make the difference (MADoPA
FC P7 MARIA)
IC and FC participants tended to consider that older people
were resistant to change and could be stubborn.
8. I think that these older people, they will not go with
the robot, really! From the experience with my
father… He would not say something like, ‘OK I will
walk’, more like: ‘switch that device off’ (ZUYD IC2
P3 MARIA)
They tended to anticipate that older people would have
difficulties accepting a robotic carer. OP participants did
not always bear out this view. They did not question the
presence of the robot. Instead, they commented on aspects
of the robot’s actual or potential behaviour that they would
not/did not like, and also on what they thought would be
advantageous about having a robotic carer (see Draper
et al. 2014b).
Assigning roles that imply norms
Another strategy that our participants employed to resolve
tensions between values in scenarios was to refer to norms
associated with particular roles, which were then applied to
the robot. The participants did not individually or within
particular focus groups or group types consistently assign
the robot a specific role; instead, participants assigned
different roles in different circumstances. The most com-
monly referred-to roles were servant, healthcare provider
(see UoB OP3 P7 quotation 12 below), or extension of a
human healthcare provider and companion:
9. I think his [Louis] relationship with the robot is the
best one. He actually looks on it as a [5: friend!]
helping with his life and supporting him (UoB OP2
P2 LOUIS)
10. The advantage of a robot, it’s, you were talking,
you had a home-help two hours, three hours per
week, the robot, once it’s there and equipped, can
work 10 hours a day. That doesn’t bother it
(MADoPA IC3 P1 MARIA)
Here the idea that there was no upper limit on the time
demands that can be made on the robot is linked to its
being a machine. Unsurprisingly the idea that the robot was
machine or thing (as opposed to a person) was expressed
often. The following is a typical reaction, especially when
the robot in the scenario had been programmed, or could be
programmed, to be more assertive:
11. To me a robot will always be a machine
(MADoPA IC1 P2 MARIA)
The participants associated different norms with different
roles. For example, assigning the robot the role of a
servant enabled them to assert that users could reasonably
expect the robot to do as it was told. On the other hand,
when they felt that it was reasonable for the robot to be
programmed to resist certain activities—gambling for
example in the Louis case—this was because they thought
it would be wrong for a healthcare professional to
introduce, facilitate or appear to encourage a patient to
gamble.
12. it is a bit like the nurse coming in and saying
‘Shall we have a game of poker?’ isn’t it. And you
wouldn’t expect that (UoB OP3 P7 LOUIS)
Postulating and adhering to a prior agreement
Finally, some participants assumed that in the pre-history
of the scenario situations the parameters for robotic beha-
viour had been agreed with the older person in advance.
They referred to a prior agreement as a mechanism for
enforcing expectations in practice. This meant, for exam-
ple, that even if they regarded the robot as a machine or
servant to be commanded they could, at the same time,
limit what a user might command it to do. Prior agreement
was also a mechanism for respecting autonomy since it was
implied that if someone had agreed to do something, other
things being equal, they would have done so autonomously
and should abide by the agreement.
13. You have chosen yourself to have that thing in
your house, so you also have to accept the things it
does. (ZUYD OP1 P2 MARIA)
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14. I’m assuming that this isn’t forced on her she
agreed to have a robot, so stay at home and have a
robot rather than sort of saying ‘Right, if you don’t
have it you have got to go to care’ so it’s not
something she has got to have. It’s something that she
makes the choice to have the robot and I think you
made that choice she has got to pay a little attention
to it even if it is a robot. (UH OP P2 MARIA)
We now turn to our participants’ views on each of the six
values in the ethical framework from the Phase One ethics
work.
Autonomy
Autonomy is the capacity to make choices and lead one’s
life as one chooses. All types of participants agreed that
being older was not itself a reason for taking such choices
away from people.
15. Elderly people still have their personal freedom
and if they say no it should be no, shouldn’t it?’’
(MADoPA OP1 P1 MARIA)
16. [older people] are still capable of making their
own decisions. (ZUYD IC1 P3 LOUIS)
17. It always comes back to the fact that what the
professional care worker needs or wants is not nec-
essarily what the user needs or wants. Our priority is
the user’s need or want and we have to take it into
account. We aren’t going to do anything without the
user; if he or she doesn’t want to do something, we
can’t force them to do so against their wishes.
(MADoPA FC1 P6 FRANK)
Participants were aware, however, that if older people had
lost, or were beginning to lose, their mental abilities, this
might be a reason for giving less weight to their choices,
especially when these choices posed a risk to safety or
well-being or where they depended for their fulfilment on
the cooperation of a reluctant carer.
By using the compromise, persuasion or negotiation
processes to resolve conflicts in the scenarios, participants
were already giving considerable weight to the autonomy
of the older person, but alongside the autonomy of formal
and informal human carers (as reported above). Robots, on
the other hand, do not have autonomy, and some partici-
pants did not like the idea of a ‘mere machine’ apparently
going against the autonomous wishes of the older person.
Others thought that the ability of the robot to persist where
humans might become exhausted or demoralised was
valuable (as suggested by participant MADoPA IC3 P1 in
quotation 10 above). Equally, however, it might be a dis-
advantage if it only served to wear-down the older user to
the point of compliance as this would be coercion not
persuasion, and would undermine autonomy.
18. I’ve got a slight problem with this nagging if
you’re saying that that it could go on prompting you
because it knows you haven’t moved. Presumably it’s
recording that. I’ve got a slight problem that this is
very Big Brother-ish we’re going to catch you out if
you try and lie to us about what you’re doing (UoB
OP2 P1 MARIA)
As we have seen, our participants generally favoured
autonomy-promoting paternalism delivered by means of
human persuasion. Robot pressure on the older person’s
behaviour, by contrast, had to be time-limited: for the
participants, the robot could only go so far before the will
of the older person had to prevail. This was partly because
participants were concerned that the older person might
depend on the robot, and therefore be vulnerable to harm if
the robot refused to help. For instance, in the first scenario,
there was concern that Marie would become dehydrated if
the robot engaged in a battle of wills with her over whether
she went to the kitchen herself to fetch a drink.
All groups acknowledged that in the care triad (older
person-informal carers-formal carers), the wishes and
interests of people other than the older householder needed
to be taken into account. Consideration of a conflict of these
interests was prompted by the fourth scenario, where Louis’
reluctance to programme the robot to alert carers to his
falling had resulted in his spending a long time on the floor,
which had in turn increased care demands on his daughters-
in-law. Of the three groups, the FC participants were gen-
erally less willing to settle conflicts in favour of the older
person, though they were not especially sympathetic to the
interests of informal carers. Rather they drew attention to
the fact that they were themselves a limited resource that
had to be distributed fairly among their clients (as illustrated
MADoPA FC1 P5’s comment quotation 4 above).
Independence
People are independent when they are able to act on their
choices without significant help from others. The
ACCOMPANY project envisaged a care-robot not for the
incapacitated or seriously disabled but for those who as a
result of increasing age-related frailty find it harder to carry
out certain tasks, e.g. lifting or house-cleaning. Indepen-
dent older people might be able to carry out these tasks
while taking longer—perhaps much longer—to do them
than younger people. On the other hand, they do not
depend on others to decide on their activities, or to feed and
clean themselves, or to take medication.
Views about independence (as distinct from autonomy)
were not especially prominent in the focus group
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discussions. A few participants noted that the way a
householder chose to use the robot could erode its ability to
promote independence. They noted, for instance, that
fetching and carrying functions could disincline users to
fetch and carry for themselves, with the possible result that
they lose the ability to fetch and carry for themselves and
so require more care.
19. ‘‘I pay to have someone do things for me’’. My
response is, ‘‘Yes, you pay, but you pay to have
someone help you do things’’, which people don’t like
hearing because for them it’s a case of, ‘‘I pay
therefore you do it instead of me’’. (MADoPA FC1
P4 MARIA)
20. In her situation I wouldn’t actually program the
robot at all to get her the treats. Because there isn’t
actually a need in her normal state (UH IC P1
MARIA)
This reflects a tension between independence and auton-
omy that the scenarios were designed to express. The
participants seemed to favour a balance between indepen-
dence and autonomy. For example, they generally sup-
ported the idea of a care-robot designed to give reminders
to take medication. Difficulties remembering to take
medications—due to degrees of memory loss or complex-
ity of medication regimes—are an impediment to living
independently, and therefore having reminders was
regarded as useful support, but something that fell short
of the take-over of the administration of medication.
Enablement
For the purposes of this paper, enablement is a process,
possibly involving the care-robot, of acquiring or regaining
certain abilities needed in daily life. Participants’ attitudes
to enablement were mixed. They could see the value of a
robot that was able to help older people regain or acquire
skills, but they worried about coercion. As already men-
tioned, participants expressed doubts about the robot’s
ability to persuade, and they were concerned about the
robot forcing cooperation from its user.
The scenarios provided different examples of enable-
ment that the ACCOMPANY robot might support.
Although we had envisaged that participants’ views about
enablement would be elicited mainly by the first scenario,
the other scenarios prompted interesting comments as well.
What emerged was a spectrum of views on health-related
enablement, with reminders to take prescribed medicine at
one end and health-promotion at the other. Possible inter-
ventions were placed on the spectrum according to whether
participants thought that a particular behaviour should or
should not be modified. So, reminders to take prescription
medicine was regarded a relatively uncontroversial,
whereas using the robot to prevent smoking, alcohol con-
sumption, physical inactivity and poor diet were more
controversial. They were more controversial because par-
ticipants doubted that robots designed to help older people
should limit people’s liberty to take risks with their own
health.
21. I don’t think a robot is a power thing that can
change behaviour…. It is her choice. A robot can’t
be used as a power to change the behaviour of an
adult woman. That is my opinion. (ZUYD FC2 P6
NINA)
A particular concern was that robot monitoring might be
used to interfere with the user’s choices (again typified by
the comment from UB OP2 P1 quotation 18 above). Some
participants seemed to worry that permitting the robot to
modify the behaviour of users at all would be the start of a
slippery slope leading to the robot’s taking control. Other
participants were concerned about robot interference in
possibly harmful but nevertheless autonomous choices
expressive of the user’s strong or characteristic
preferences.
22. I think if they’re constrained to the physical
assistance then that is fine as it’s when they stray into
this kind of behaviour modification and all the rest of
it, it starts to get a bit worrying (UoB OP2 P4 NINA)
Participants did not necessarily approve of the choices
individuals made in the scenarios (Frank’s gambling was
considered reckless by some, for instance) but they
regarded interference with some choices as an attempt to
change what someone was like. This they generally
disapproved of, particularly in relation to the Nina scenario
(we have reported this finding in detail elsewhere, (Draper
and Sorell 2014). For many different reasons, then, the
participants often seemed to favour autonomy over inter-
ventions for the sake of enablement (as the ZUYD
participant PC2 P6 quotation 21 above suggests).
In fact, the tension between autonomy and enablement
may be more complicated. Participants did not disapprove
of efforts to enable older people; they were concerned that
these efforts would be made by the robot as opposed to
human carers who were able to negotiate with the older
person. In each of the groups, negotiation or persuasion
was regarded as completely acceptable, so long as rejection
of suggested behaviours was open to the older person.4
4 Indeed, the some participants seem to favour weak paternalism
(Childress 1982) in some circumstances. For instance, some thought
that removing Louis’ sticks and providing him with a frame was
acceptable because Louis could still get around using the frame, or
even chose to try to walk without it (it would just be more difficult for
him to do so). Likewise, some thought that the robot could be
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Participants were concerned about whether the robot would
be so inflexible as to be coercive, and as we have already
seen our participants tended to doubt that a robot could
replace a human when it came to coaxing the older person.
Enablement can include rehabilitation, which often
requires an effort on the part of the person seeking to be re-
enabled. This may consist of effort in the face of physical
discomfort, and frustration associated with an action that
could previously be performed with ease. Technology
sometimes accommodates more passive rehabilitation (as
in the case of mechanical devices that gently and repeat-
edly move limbs to rebuild muscle strength and increase
movement range) but even these may require the user to
make some effort and endure some discomfort. Such
devices, although they are set up by physiotherapists,
remain in the control of the user; if the machine-assisted
movement causes too much pain, the user may simply stop
using the device. The question is whether the older person
could and should have a similar level of control over a
care-robot.
In the ACCOMPANY system the scope for the robot to
control the older person was very limited. It could verbally
encourage movement (‘come to the window’) or perhaps
resist a command (refuse to fetch something to encourage
the person to get it (move) for her/himself). These con-
straints were reflected in the scenarios and topic guide.
Some participants imagined the robot turning off the TV or
positioning itself in front of it against Marie’s wishes until
Marie elevated her leg. Even though the participants were
not averse to robotic enablement, they disapproved of the
robot’s seemingly asserting itself. Sometimes participants
appeared indirectly to express a fear that a robot might
force someone to perform painful movements, which they
regarded as unacceptable,5 even where these were part of a
therapeutic regime.6
23. I am not sure if a robot, if it can be forceful…if
you do not walk with me, I will not do that or
whatever (ZUYD IC2 P1 MARIA)
Many of our participants felt that if a user was unwilling to
cooperate with the enabling functions of the robot, it was
not unreasonable for the authority paying for the robot to
remove and reallocate it.
24. To begin with, if someone wants a robot in their
home, if they decide to get one, then what’s the point
if afterwards they actually don’t listen to it?… To my
way of thinking, with the robot it’s the as when you
go to see a doctor. If you don’t take the medication he
prescribes for you, why bother going in the first
place? (MADoPA OP1 P7 General reflection on all
cases at the end of the FG session)
25. That they actually sign that they agree to having
this robot instead of going into a care home because
the function of this robot is not just to be useful but
also for health and safety. (UH IC P4 LOUIS)
Safety
Safety is being insulated from sources of harm. The insu-
lation can be provided by one’s own choices and policies or
by the interventions and policies of others.
The safety of the older householder was discussed in
response to all of the scenarios. It was a concern for some
participants even where a scenario was not designed to
emphasise safety. Some participants were concerned that
harm could befall Marie and Nina if the robot refused to act
on their instructions.
26. I think it’s dreadful that—[the] machine…
actually not do what it’s supposed to do [4: fright-
ening] [2: I find that quite quite] scary Yeah and I
think that’s awful to have, to programme a machine
that that sort of won’t help her (UoB OP2 P5 NINA)
Participants were also concerned about the potential
dangers of internet interactions in the Frank scenario, and
the risks of gambling in the case of Louis.
In the Louis scenario as well, many were very uncom-
fortable about Louis being able to prevent robot-alerts
about his falls, or remaining on the floor for long periods
following a fall. In this scenario Louis was in control of the
programming and elected not to programme the robot to
summon help, a decision that was questioned by his
daughters-in-law. In all the focus groups, the predominant
feeling was that the robot should summon help in the event
of a fall regardless of the older person’s wishes to the
contrary.
27. Only then and not every time. He indeed falls
multiple times a day and you don’t have to be
alarmed every time, but you can set the sensors that
they send an alarm if he’s on the same spot for
10 minutes. (ZUYD FC2 P4 LOUIS)
28. I mean probably the robot would only need alert
with falls when he stayed down. (UH OP P2 LOUIS)
Footnote 4 continued
reprogrammed so as not to be a portal to gambling sites because this
still left open other avenues for gambling.
5 See also comments on safety below which also express the strength
of concern about an assertive robot.
6 Elsewhere we have alluded to the possibility of looking at this issue
from the perspective of ethical norms for physiotherapy (see Sorell
and Draper 2014).
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As the above comments suggest, the most commonly
proposed compromise was that the householder be given
time to get up before the robot alerted external agents, but
our participants mostly supported the use of a default alert
setting: the householder could choose within narrow limits
how quickly an alert was issued, but would not be able to
override the default setting completely. They thought that
the user could also be given a choice about whom to
notify—this might not be the daughters-in-law in the case
of Louis—but they seemed to suggest that it would be
unacceptable for no-one to be alerted. There was no
specific agreement amongst participants about the precise
point the alert would be sounded regardless of the users’
wishes. Instead, participants spoke vaguely about the point
at which the user would suffer harm if help was not
forthcoming.
Participants appealed to role-norms in this connection.
They found it incongruous that a robot carer could be
present and not summon help. Some participants tended to
anthropomorphise the robot, thinking of it as a human
being standing idly by and doing nothing. For others, the
robot represented a safety net that should not be disabled.
29. P7: It should at least raise the alarm. According
to this example, we’re dealing with a gentleman who
falls a lot but generally manages to get up again by
himself, but the day he didn’t manage, the robot
didn’t do anything.
P1: Precisely!
P7: The robot should have raised the alarm.
(MADoPA FC1 LOUIS)
For our participants, keeping older people safe from
particularly serious harm was close in importance to
autonomy in a hierarchy of values.
Privacy
A person enjoys privacy when there is restricted access to
information about them, including information that can be
gained by observation. Our participants generally agreed
on the importance of privacy. Our FC groups tended to
discuss privacy in relation to formulas and routines that
they took to be embedded in their professional codes of
conduct and good practices. Other groups tended to
describe their views in terms of unwelcome intrusion or
‘Big Brother’ surveillance—quotation 18 above is typical
in this respect.
At the same time, there was little resistance to, and some
positive support for, information being accessed directly by
health professionals for therapeutic purposes. Here the
robot seems to have been regarded as an extension of the
healthcare professional or a therapeutic tool. Nevertheless,
participants were concerned about health information being
accessed by or passed to family members/informal carers.
In this connection they seemed to be applying the norms of
medical confidentiality.
30. I think that’s more medical but I think, so I don’t
think the daughters-in-law need to be informed of
that, but falls that he didn’t get up from, yes… I don’t
think they should be entitled to know anything that’s
too personal. I think his personal life at his age as he
is obviously still ‘compos mentis’ it’s his business.
They should be entitled to know things that deal with
his safety. (UH OP P2 LOUIS)
The FC participants in some groups were concerned that
the robot could be used to monitor the care they were
providing.
31. P4: I think it’s all very ‘Big Brother is watching
you’ if you have such a thing in your home and it can
be programmed at all times to turn against me.
P1: Yes. You could look at it like that. (ZUYD FC2
NINA)
Our participants did not have a clear view of what the robot
would be recording and in what format. A robot could in
principle make continuous video recordings similar to a
CCTV camera. Whether this would be privacy-violating
would depend on why and how the recordings were made,
what was recorded, who could access these recordings and
on whose authority, how secure the data-storage system
was, and how long the data was stored. For instance, visual
images of robot-human interactions might be useful for
enablement. The robot might be able to enhance the user’s
recall by providing pictures of when s/he last ate or drank,
took tablets, telephoned a family member etc. (Ho et al.
2013). Some of the FC participants thought it would be
useful to access information stored by the robot.
32. They could look at the print out together, that
wouldn’t be quite as invasive as the robot saying:
‘Actually she didn’t do that when I told her three
times and she didn’t get up!’ (UH FC PF MARIA)
33. They cannot cheat, right?… That is the differ-
ence. The measures are taken and the robot sends
them on to the physician. So there is no possibility to
add a few degrees, or make it some degrees less.
(ZUYD FC1 P2 MARIA)
Social connectedness
Social connectedness is having regular exposure to an
interaction with other people, often other people with
whom one has things in common. It is valuable because it
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alleviates loneliness, and has other benefits. Older people
are more likely than middle-aged adults to lose their friends
or spouses through death. Some forms of disability and
incapacity due to old age can also make their surviving
friendships among old people less valuable. Social inter-
actions stimulate people and make cognitive and other
demands they would not otherwise meet.
The importance of social connectedness was reflected in
the discussions of the OP and IC groups, but was not
prominent in reactions of the FC group, which tended to
concentrate on the way their own interactions with older
people could not be simulated or reproduced by care-
robots. Participants from other groups tended to agree that
at least some human interaction was irreplaceable.
34. I suppose a robot is not like a human you can
interact with really…It will do requests and what you
need, or it’s programmed to, y’know remind you of
things. But it’s not the same as having a person who
you can talk about anything to. (UoB OP1 P2
LOUIS)
35. …we rely a great deal on neighbours, a great
deal indeed. It’s really important for people to be
integrated into their community. (MADoPA IC1 P1
MARIA)
Social contact and being part of a community were
considered valuable quite apart from receiving care from
humans. Some of the groups did, however, discuss how
social connectedness provided a care safety net for older
people. For instance, being integrated into a community
meant that neighbours and others noticed deviations from
normal behaviour (not opening shutters or not being seen out
and about) that could indicate an older person in difficulties.
The Frank scenario was designed to elicit reactions to a
potential tension between autonomy and social connect-
edness. In response, some participants drew a distinction
between loneliness and being alone, recognising that not all
people who are socially isolated actually want or miss
human company.
36. I know three people who are in their mid and late
nineties. Two are very active, very outgoing…One
will not [go out]. And that is the fundamental differ-
ence between them and they have been like that all
their lives. (UoB OP1 P7 FRANK)
Nevertheless, participants were generally in favour of
coaxing older people at least to try to remain socially
connected. This suggests that they thought people should
not settle for loneliness by the mechanism of adaptive
preference.
Our participants discussed both virtual social connect-
edness and maintaining relationships by video-calling and
social networking sites. The participants who spoke in
these discussions all seemed to be familiar with this use of
the internet. They found interactions using Skype/internet
useful, and many readily likened the type of use proposed
to Frank in the second scenario to their existing use of
personal computers/tablets. Reactions to purely virtual
relationships tended to be guarded. In the OP groups par-
ticularly, many participants were not convinced that virtual
relationships were a substitute for what they termed ‘real’
relationships.
Undoubtedly, older people who do not or cannot use the
internet will face increasing social exclusion in the future.
It might, therefore, be useful for a robot to encourage the
use of the internet for purposes that connect older people to
social institutions and services as well as maintain and
form new, more personal relationships. In this respect, the
participants’ distinction between ‘real’ and virtual inter-
actions has less and less application. One French partici-
pant—whose views are not representative of participants at
large—was puzzled by the attitude of others in his group to
the use of the internet. He said:
37. The word virtual is used, and is used when a
screen is involved. When you’re on the phone with
someone, the word virtual is never used to describe it.
[Others interject: But it’s the same thing] Yes it is, so
why is it that we don’t use the word ‘virtual’ when
telephones are involved but do when there’s a screen,
whereas with a screen we actually add something and
can see the person we’re talking to? I’ve been won-
dering about this for some time, I don’t understand
why. (MADoPA IC1 P1 FRANK)
Discussion
Insofar as the scenarios were designed to indicate potential
tensions between the values we had already proposed on
philosophical grounds, our data did not suggest that the
value framework required significant addition or revision.
Participants tended to recognise the importance of all of the
values proposed without apparently calling attention to
entirely new ones. They also tended to prioritise autonomy
over all but safety where there was a risk of serious harm.
Here we discuss a selection of the results reported above
before looking at how the value framework might influence
the design of social robots and how they are introduced into
the homes of older people.
The value framework—the six values plus a weighting
of their relative importance—could be interpreted as sup-
porting autonomous decisions with ill effects on informal
carers or friends or even state welfare services. We have
commented elsewhere (Draper and Sorell 2013) on the
62 H. Draper, T. Sorell
123
ethical difficulties that may arise when telecare technology
can detect falls and older users disable this equipment.
Falls undoubtedly create demands on health services and
can lead to longer term difficulties and health problems for
older people—even those who up to the point of falling
were fairly independent. Where these demands are made on
resources in welfare states, it may be reasonable to ask or
even require citizens to minimise these demands. This may
mean not using services frivolously, taking precautions
against infection, or adhering to advice and treatment
regimes. In the same way, people might be asked to min-
imise demands on informal carers. If someone is dependent
on the good will of others for help, this provides them with
a reason not turn for help unnecessarily. Arguably, the
more dependent one is, the greater the need for cooperation
that prevents greater dependence or dependence in emer-
gencies on informal carers. Co-operating with a robot care
regime may be a case in point, but unless the care-robot can
provide everything provided by informal carers, the inter-
ests of informal carers should play some part in negotia-
tions leading to its installation into the older person’s
home. The participants tended to agree with that line of
thought. However, the interests that informal carers
believed were relevant were only those directly related to
the care they provided.
Different considerations were thought relevant in dif-
ferent circumstances. Participants did not believe informal
carers had the right to frustrate older people’s life-style
choices, even if they cost money and threatened carers’
inheritances. The issue was posed clearly by the fourth
scenario, in which Louis was involved in online gambling,
with all its risks of increasing dependence. Getting into
debt was generally viewed as socially irresponsible, justi-
fying restricted gambling stakes (e.g. by imposing the
‘affordability’ ceiling). If the robot is the medium through
which socially irresponsible behaviour is facilitated, then
modifying the programming to prevent such behaviour
may be acceptable. On the other hand, the ‘good will’ that
should motivate the provision of informal care might not be
compatible with limiting spending that erodes an inheri-
tance. In all cases, however, it is important to bear in mind
that limitations of this kind are not confined to older peo-
ple; they apply to anyone who is autonomous but depen-
dent—regardless of age.
Some FC participants complained that they did not have
sufficient time with their clients, and in a different context
they explained that they sometimes had to spend more time
than expected with one client, which made them late for an
appointment with another. Additional time pressures cre-
ated by care-robot monitoring of carers may generate
hostility to the robot unless this information is also used to
improve FCs’ working conditions. Employing the robot to
‘‘police’’ care may discourage poor care practices, with
benefits to older people. But it can also intrude on the
privacy of the older person. Striking a balance between
monitoring for good practice and privacy may be difficult
where care involves nudity or captures private conversa-
tions. Recording would almost certainly require the consent
of the older person, except where there were suspicions of
both poor care and intimidation. The requirement that care/
medical interactions be video recorded—and kept as part of
a patient’s medical record—is already being considered in
some jurisdictions. Recordings could provide a definitive
account of an interaction in the event of legal challenge,
disciplinary action or unforeseen outcome. Such a policy
raises complex data protection and access issues. For
instance, access to recordings might only be granted for
audit purposes or where there were suspicions about
misconduct.
In our view, using the robot to police care would not
violate the privacy of formal carers.7 All care compromises
patient/client privacy to some degree. Ensuring that
appropriate care is provided may necessitate careful
record-keeping to facilitate a smooth hand-over between
carers, and so that care can be audited and improved.
Human carers themselves see aspects of a person’s life that
they would not otherwise witness. Providing good care
may depend in part on remembering these details, but even
if it did not carers could not be required to forget them.
Humans cannot will a loss of memory. Carers may be
required to recount their experiences to others, or they may
be required not to disclose them. At other times disclosure
may be selective or heavily edited. The robot that records
all its interactions with a user is in some senses similar to a
human carer with a memory and does not therefore raise
any greater concerns for privacy than human care does.
The privacy concerns are raised by access to information.
In this respect a gossipy and judgemental human carer may
be more invasive than a care-robot.
The practice of having carers explore recorded infor-
mation about the behaviour of the older person with that
older person could be a useful way of resolving obstacles to
adherence to a care regime (see quotation 32). However,
the comment supplied by ZUYD FC1 P2 (quotation 33)
points to a different and perhaps questionable reason for
accessing this record, namely to check the veracity of the
patient/client. Where the robot collects data to enable a
willing householder to be more independent, the data col-
lection does not violate privacy. And more data may be
therapeutically better than less. Consider, for instance, a
7 As the ACCOMPANY system was targeted at older people living
alone, we do not here consider the privacy implications for others—
including informal carers—who might be sharing a home with the
older person for whom the robot is being provided.
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robot that monitors whether medication has been taken and
issues a reminder when it is not taken. Such a robot might
be more enabling than a robot that acts like an alarm clock
and simply reports that now is the specified time to take the
medication. In the former case, the user has the opportunity
to remember for herself to take her medication; in the latter
she may come to rely on the alarm rather than her own
memory. She may be helped to live independently, but she
may also become increasingly dependent on the robot to
provide the reminder as her capacity to use her own
memory is eroded.
To act as an alarm clock the robot does not need to
collect personal information. To issue the reminder, the
robot needs to monitor what the user is doing. More
information is stored (not just what medication should be
taken and when, but also whether it has been taken), but
with an enabling purpose. Assuming this information is
only accessible to the older person (in the form of the
enabling reminder to which she has agreed) her privacy is
not violated. In the latter case, however, there may be a
concern that the person will take the medication twice—
once of her own volition and then again when the robot
issues the reminder. It may therefore be argued that the
robot needs to monitor whether the medication is taken in
order to cancel an unnecessary reminder. Here safety
concerns begin to surface that appear to conflict with the
protection of privacy. Another issue might be that, like a
human carer, the robot should be able to monitor medica-
tion adherence so as to alert someone if non-adherence
reaches a dangerous level. This would be consistent with
the position outlined above with regard to falls: the older
person may want a higher threshold for intervention than
carers are comfortable with, but a default position that
harmonises with the views of our participants is that if the
threat to safety is significant, the robot should raise an
alarm.
Programming a robot to alert someone if medication is
not taken might violate privacy. It might deprive the user of
the liberty—available to all other competent adults—of not
complying with a care regime. These concerns may nev-
ertheless be outweighed by considerations of harm. The
unauthorized but perhaps justified transmission of infor-
mation to a third party adds to any violation of privacy.
Some loss of privacy is the inevitable result of being cared
for—by a robot or a human alike. On the other hand, it may
be an avoidable violation of privacy for healthcare pro-
fessionals to have access to information stored by the robot
(for the purpose of routinely monitoring adherence and
honest reporting of adherence—the kind of use suggested
by ZUYD FC1 P2 in quotation 33). Patients can be inac-
curate or dishonest in reporting their adherence to a care
regime as well as their intake of alcohol and calories etc.
(Buetow et al. 2009). One response to this is for
practitioners to be sceptical about patient reporting and
adjust their judgements accordingly. This scepticism is
caricatured by the TV character Dr Gregory House, whose
approach is encapsulated by statements such as:
• ‘‘I don’t ask why patients lie, I just assume they all do’’;
• ‘‘It’s a basic truth of the human condition that
everybody lies. The only variable is about what’’;
• ‘‘…when you want to know the truth about someone
that someone is probably the last person you should
ask’’.
It could be argued that patient dishonesty should not be
encouraged and that therefore programming the robot so as
to prevent a sceptical Dr House from interrogating its data
is to collude with patient dishonesty. It might be argued
that even if other patients are able to get away with being
dishonest, that does not mean that older patients with a
robot should be able to, and the relevant difference is not
age but the presence of the robot.
On the other hand, this argument may overlook an
important difference between robotic and human carers and
companions: robots are not moral agents. One of the rea-
sons privacy is compromised when one takes a carer or
companion (or even a servant) into one’s home is that this
person can neither avoid exposure to personal information,
nor avoid making sense of the information to which they
are exposed. There is a shared understanding of the
potential normative implications of a carer’s seeing an
unexpected person sharing the householder’s bed, over-
hearing a phone call to the betting office or alcohol retailer,
or reading aloud a letter from a solicitor about changes to a
will. If confronted by a wife or child asking questions about
these events, a human servant/carer/companion has to
make a normative judgement about the relative importance
of infidelity, gambling, alcohol use and disinheriting a
family member compared with some prior agreement to
maintain confidentiality. For the robot there is no such
tension. This could be regarded by some older people as a
potential advantage of having robot as a carer. The robot is
not nosey—it has no personal interest in finding certain
things out, items of information are merely data. The robot
does not secretly or otherwise pass judgement on those it
serves. In this respect an all-seeing robot may be less pri-
vacy-violating than a human carer who is present less
often.
Giving older people control over who can access their
personal data from the robot is the best way of protecting
their privacy, and also conforms to the norms for data
protection. This means that healthcare professionals should
not be able to check the veracity of a patient’s reported
adherence without that patient’s consent, with the result
that patients with a robot have the same scope for deception
(or ‘‘cheat[ing]’’) as patients who do not need robotic care.
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Operationalizing the value framework
Rather than a revision of the value framework arrived at in
Phase One of the ACCOMPANY project, the results from
the focus groups seem to call for the operationalization of
its emphasis on autonomy. Operationalization includes,
crucially, the processes by which the robot is introduced to
the user’s home in the first place. Our participants seemed
independently to arrive at our view that it is reasonable to
hold users to an agreement made in advance of the robot
being introduced. The agreement should set out the pur-
poses that e.g. a local housing, council or health authority
had in offering a care-robot, and we are assuming that one
of these purposes is—as in the ACCOMPANY design
brief—the promotion of autonomous and independent liv-
ing. If this is right, then the agreement needs to reflect
processes in which potential users of the robot are: (a) in-
formed of the capacities of the robot; (b) consulted about
which of these capacities might be useful to them; and,
(c) informed of the options to refuse or withdraw co-op-
eration with the robot in its exercise of capacities that the
older person finds useful. The options in (c) might them-
selves be activated after a trial period without those
options, just to make the older person aware of what living
with the robot might be like and how useful it could be.
Similarly, there might need to be a trial process of with-
drawal of the robot, so that the older person can experience
what life without the robot would be like if it were with-
drawn. Ideally, potential users would be seen individually
and face-to-face, with discussion encouraged. No less
seems reasonable when so expensive a piece of equipment,
and such an unfamiliar one, is introduced for long term use
in someone’s home.
In addition to the older person’s own interactions with
the robot, the agreement would have to take into account
data-retention by the robot and retransmission of the data
to: (i) the robot-introducing authority; (ii) formal carers,
including healthcare professionals; and, (iii) informal car-
ers and family members. In keeping with the value
framework, the older person should normally be given the
opportunity to veto data-sharing with certain groups listed,
or certain members of groups listed.
Beyond any trial period with the robot, a pattern of non-
adherence to the agreement could be allowed to develop up
to a threshold where an interview about removing the robot
was triggered. Allowing the older person a chance to see
and discuss the evidence of non-adherence might be
important to a subsequent decision on their part to co-
operate with the aims of enablement more wholeheartedly,
or it might prompt a reconsideration of the suitability of
independent living, or it might call attention to defects in
the original agreement that need to be remedied. In any of
these cases, the user has an autonomous choice to make.
The process so far outlined does not mention the pos-
sibility of a user’s simply turning off the robot’s monitor-
ing functions, or the possibility of overriding an emergency
alert. These possibilities are relevant to the older person’s
control over information about themselves, including
information about falls. Control of such information is
greater for unaccompanied older people than for accom-
panied ones, and loss of control might discourage some
older people from opting for a robot companion. Perhaps
there is a compromise available where the older person has
the option of disrupting monitoring for short, or at least
clearly defined, periods. This might appeal to older users
who wanted to have very private conversations or engage
in some other activity that they thought was very private.
Consideration does, however, have to be given to a
potential undesirable side-effect of this measure to protect
privacy. This is that an older person may be coerced into
turning off the monitoring facility by a carer wishing to
conceal poor care (i.e. where a robot is also being used to
police the standard of care provided). Mechanisms already
exist for steps to be taken to protect vulnerable adults
where there is suspicion of coercion, and many older
people already experience sub-standard care and suffer
abuse at the hands of their so-called carers that goes
unreported.8 So an older person might not be worse off
with a facility to disable monitoring than he or she would
have been without the robot. A decision has to be made,
therefore, about whether the potential policing capacity of
the robot is sufficiently great to outweigh the threat to
privacy of not being able to disable the monitoring facility.
Although many other matters could in principle be made
subject to an agreement, including the threshold that had to
be reached for some monitored mishap to count as a gen-
uine emergency, it is not necessary to go much further. The
guiding thought is that the process for introducing the
robot, as well as the robot itself, has to be sensitive to the
wishes of the older person within certain limits. If they are
not, both the design of the robot and its method of intro-
duction into a household are ethically flawed.
Operationalizing autonomy is not only a matter of the
agreement that lays down the ground rules. It is a matter
also of what needs to be done to the robot in design terms.
We offer one example here, which relates to concerns that
some kinds of robots are infantilising. Such concerns
(discussed and countered by Sharkey and Sharkey 2012)
are mainly to do with robots that look like children’s toys.
Our data suggested another potentially infantilising pre-
sentation of enablement to older people. This is what we
8 O’Keeffe et al. reported that ‘2.6% of people aged 66 and over
living in private households reported that they had experienced
mistreatment involving a family member, close friend or care worker
during the past year’. See O’Keeffe et al. (2007) and Cooper et al.
(2008).
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describe as the ‘let’s do it together’ method of coaxing
older people to try new things or engage with enablement.
This type of infantilisation does not consist merely of a
tone of voice that may be used by the robot (the sing-song
tone often used by adults to address a child). ‘Let’s do it
together’ coaxing is infantilising because it may fail to
engage with the older person’s reasons for not wanting to
perform an action or behave in a particular kind of way. It
may indeed assume an absence of reasons for not co-
operating, questionably positing instead a kind of older
person’s stubbornness corresponding to childish refusals
to co-operate. Adult-to-adult persuasion operates under a
norm of giving reasons to a person which, if accepted,
justify the choice of co-operating and make the co-oper-
ation autonomous. In seeking to persuade someone, one
tries to identify and take seriously any reasons for points
of disagreement. One does not just assume that the
obstacle is stubbornness or timidity born of having to try
something new without support. Only if that sort of
timidity is operating is the ‘Let’s do it together’ strategy
not infantilising. And arriving at the conclusion that the
older person is timid ought to (morally ought to) proceed
only after an attempt to identify and articulate reasons for
co-operation or non-co-operation.
There may be occasions where ‘doing it together’ is
unobjectionable. If someone feels unable to walk in the
park because they are afraid of tripping, then offering to
walk with them and lend a supportive arm addresses their
fear. It takes it seriously and offers a potential solution to
a problem that is reducing the choices available to the
older person. But if, on the other hand, someone says that
they do not care for walking in the rain, offering to get
wet with them misses the point. ‘Let’s do it together’ may
suggest that, like the child, all the older person requires to
change their mind is an encouraging presence while they
get on and do something they really do not want to do.
When adults form supportive pairs or groups those
banding together all want the same thing and feel that
they are offering mutual, not patronising, support to
achieving an end in which all share; they are doing
together what they would struggle to achieve alone. It is a
form of solidarity. ‘Let’s do it together’, on the other
hand, may be an offer the only aim of which is getting the
other person to do something they do not want to do. It is
often something the person doing the offering is already
able to do effortlessly—it is not necessarily a declaration
of solidarity. Designers and programmers therefore need
to be aware that in this respect, robotic efforts of the ‘let’s
do it together’ variety might always be patronising since
the robot is not capable of appreciating the end, whatever
it is programmed to say by way of encouragement along
the way.
Limitations
We have reflected on how the data gained from three dif-
ferent types of participant (older people, and informal and
formal carers of older people) enriches our understanding
of the values proposed in Sorell and Draper 2014. In
addition to the limitations identified in previous papers (see
Draper et al. 2014b; Bedaf et al. 2016), we note that the
data we report here were prompted by specific scenarios.
The scenarios were generated specifically to emphasise
potential tensions between the values we had already
identified, and responses confirmed that participants
appealed to similar values when addressing scenarios. On
the other hand, focussing on scenarios designed to elicit
responses to these tensions will almost certainly have
biased the results. We cannot be certain that participants
would not have volunteered additional values in response
to different types of scenarios, e.g. those in which the robot
was programmed to express affection or affirm the qualities
of the user. Moreover, we were guided by the remit of the
ACCOMPANY project and therefore did not include cases
where the robot needed to meet the needs of multiple users
in the same home. Only more empirical research will
reveal whether designers and those responsible for policy
and practice should consider additional guiding values for
the design of social robots. This empirical work will need
to overcome the difficulties of getting lay participants to
engage with lists, or frameworks of, values in the abstract.
Moreover, the qualitative work necessary to achieve this
will then needed to be followed-up with quantitative
research to determine the extent to which its findings can
be generalised.
Conclusions
Our findings generally supported the priority of autonomy
where it conflicts with other values, but suggested that
safety issues may perhaps be more significant than we had
previously supposed. That said, the participants’ concerns
were subtle. The robot itself was not regarded as danger-
ous. Rather concerns seemed to centre on how safe it was
to replace human judgement with robotic programming.
Some of the concerns were highly paternalistic, which may
reflect general attitudes to older people, as well as concerns
about the potential deficits of robotic care.
Our findings echo the concern expressed more widely
that robots should not be used to replace human–human
interaction. Our findings also reinforce concerns that robot
care may increase social exclusion. Efforts must be made,
therefore, to use robots to increase the range of interactions
of users outside the home.
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Our findings suggest that a care-robot designed to be
persuasive may be preferable to a robot designed to be
persistent. Whilst the potential tirelessness of the robot
overcomes the challenges to patience of human–human
interaction, it can be associated with coercion, which acts
against autonomy; persuasion, by contrast, facilitates
autonomy. On the other hand, we have identified ways in
which ostensibly persuasive techniques of robot-assisted
care can be infantilising. Acceptable enablement is con-
strained by the need to change the behaviour of users in
some cases whilst continuing to acknowledge their capac-
ity for autonomous decision-making.
The perceived role of the robot is crucial to deter-
mining the norms against which the behaviour of the
robot is judged. The greater the variety of potential
interactions between the older person and the robot, the
greater is the potential for confusion about the appropriate
norms to apply. This potential confusion may also
encourage ‘slippage’ in that the older person—and others
involved in supporting his or her independent living—
may be inclined to manipulate the norms to de-emphasise
enablement and independence. Devices simpler than
companion robots might pre-empt this problem, but at the
cost of eliminating ‘‘presence’’ in the life of older persons
(in the sense of ‘‘presence’’ used in Sorell and Draper
2014).
Concerns about the potential of robots to erode privacy
may extend beyond the user to the human-carers of that
older person. Some formal carers raised the issue of the
robot being used to ‘spy’ on them, whilst other formal
carers did seem willing to use the robot to check up on, as
well as to reinforce, adherence to treatment regimes. All
forms of human care are likely to intrude to some extent on
the privacy of the recipient of that care. Robots may be less
intrusive by comparison. As for adherence, it does not
seem acceptable to use the robot’s data-recording capaci-
ties to second guess the older person’s own testimonies.
The value of the robot’s capacity to retain and share
information for the purposes of enablement is best main-
tained by ensuring that privacy norms are respected and the
older person retains control of information that the robot
gathers. Consideration of privacy in relation to multiple
householders and issues of who ‘owns’ different types of
information that the robot may collect were beyond the
scope of our study. Further work is undoubtedly needed to
classify the information that the robot collects and to
establish criteria for legitimate access to and use of dif-
ferent kinds of information. This means taking account of
the different kinds of value (commercial and ethical) of
information the robot has to collect in order to maintain
functioning. The aim of making the development of
assistive technology profitable and affordable has to be set
against the risks that older people will see no benefit from
the commercial value of the data generated about them.
This leads us to our final conclusions in relation to the
terms under which robots are introduced into the homes of
older people.
We have signalled in several places the significance of
achieving a shared understanding of the role, capabilities
and potential behaviours of the robot. The values we have
emphasized will need to be operationalized. One critical
stage of the operationalization is the introduction of a
robot into someone’s home for the first time. The value
framework suggests that this should be a process rather
than an event. We have demonstrated that agreements
between providers and individuals have to be reached in
order for tensions between the values in our framework to
be resolved. These agreements cannot depend on gener-
alised information about older users but need to be indi-
vidualised. Having individualised agreements is in line
with the invocation of prior agreements by participants
when they tried to resolve tensions raised by the scenar-
ios. Arriving at the right agreement depends on respecting
the older person who is going to be subject to it, and
ensuring that their autonomy and privacy are not con-
sidered less important than those of other adults in similar
situations. We have tended to suggest that autonomy
overrides other values when there is a conflict, but it is
not the only value relevant to care arrangements. Indeed,
our participants thought that other values, particularly
safety, were sometimes as weighty or even more weighty
than autonomy.
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